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I. LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
1. Petitioner: Neil R. Mitchell, Successor Personal Representative of the Estate of G. 
Grant Sims 
2. Respondent: Lynda Wood, Personal Representative of the Estate of Marjorie S. 
Sims 
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IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in holding that a personal representative under a 
will did not commit an actionable breach of her fiduciary duty when she disregarded testamentary 
instructions and converted estate funds for her own use rather than funding a testamentary bypass 
trust, as instructed by the will? 
2. If a will instructs the personal representative to place the residue of the estate in 
trust and that the principal of the trust is only to be invaded and distributed to the life beneficiary 
"as is necessary for maintenance and support. . .," may or must the trustee consider the life 
beneficiary's independent assets and resources before the principal may be invaded9 Did the Utah 
Court of Appeals incorrectly analyze the meaning and effect of such testamentary instructions 
when it excused (1) the personal representative's failure to fund the trust and (2) the personal 
representative's unilateral invasion of estate principal for her own benefit, without consultation 
with the co-trustee of the unfunded trust and when she had abundant independent resources of her 
own? 
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V. OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion in this matter is published at the following citation: 
In re Estate of Marjorie S. Sims. Neil R. Mitchell v. Lynda Wood. 918 P.2d 132 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). 
VI. GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
1. Mr. Mitchell seeks review of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, entered in this 
matter on May 19, 1996 (the "Opinion"). (A copy of the Opinion is attached in Appendix A). 
2. Mr. Mitchell petitioned the Court of Appeals for rehearing, which petition was 
denied by order dated July 19, 1996. (A copy of the Order Denying Rehearing is attached in 
Appendix A). 
3. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5). 
VII. CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Mr. Mitchell submits that the following Utah statutes are controlling: 
Utah Code Ann., §§ 75-3-703, 75-3-711, and 75-3-909 (Copies are attached hereto in 
Appendix C) 
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VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves a claim made against the estate of Marjorie S. Sims who acted as 
personal representative of her husband's estate and who breached her fiduciary duties as set forth 
in her husband's will. Mr. Mitchell, as Successor Personal Representative of the Estate of 
G. Grant Sims (the "Estate"), filed a claim against the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims, a probate 
proceeding pending in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, under 
Probate No. 933900278 ES. Marjorie S. Sims was the original personal representative under the 
Last Will and Testament of G. Grant Sims (the "Will"). (A copy of the Will is attached in 
Appendix C). Under the Will, Marjorie Sims had specific duties which she did not carry out, and 
she converted funds of the Estate to her own use, contrary to the Will's specific instructions. The 
Estate was damaged by these actions and, therefore, Mr. Mitchell, as Successor Personal 
Representative of the Estate, presented the claim against the estate of Marjorie S. Sims after her 
death. 
On or about August 18, 1993, Lynda Wood (uMs. Wood"), as Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims, denied Mr. Mitchell's claim. Mr. Mitchell then filed his Petition 
and First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim, setting forth before the trial court his 
position that Marjorie Sims breached her fiduciary duty under the Will, that she misappropriated 
funds of the Estate, and that her estate was liable for the return of those funds. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Mr. Mitchell moved the Trial Court for summary judgment on his Petition. Ms. Wood 
also moved for summary judgment seeking to deny his claim. After oral argument, the Trial 
Court issued its Memorandum Decision granting in part and denying in part both motions. 
(Copies of the Memorandum Decision and accompanying Order are attached in Appendix B). 
Mr. Mitchell filed a Notice of Appeal in this Court on July 19, 1995, taking appeal from 
that part of the Trial Court's Order on Motions for Summary Judgment that denied part of 
Mr. Mitchell's Motion and granted part of Ms. Wood's Motion. Pursuant to this Court's pour-
over jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), the appeal was heard by the Utah Court of 
Appeals. After full briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals affirmed that part of the 
Trial Court's Order denying Mr. Mitchell's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court of 
Appeals did, however, reverse part of the Trial Court's Order that allowed Mrs. Sims' estate to 
retain $1,900.00 as personal representative fees. 
Mr. Mitchell petitioned the Court of Appeals to rehear the appeal. The petition was 
denied on July 19, 1996. Mr. Mitchell now seeks review of that part of the Court of Appeals' 
Opinion that affirms the Trial Court's Order denying Mr. Mitchell's motion. 
C. Statement of Facts 
G Grant Sims ("Grant") died on November 14, 1991, leaving his Last Will and Testament 
(the "Will"). Trial Court Record ("R."), at 61, 117. The Will named Grant's wife, Marjorie S. 
Sims ("Marge") as personal representative of Grant's Estate (the "Estate"), and appointed Marge 
and Mr Mitchell as co-trustees of a testamentary trust named, "The George Grant Sims Estate 
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Tax Bypass Trust" (the "Trust"). R. 64, 65. Marge was not a beneficiary under the Will except 
as to items of personal property. R. 62. 
The Will instructed Marge as personal representative to fund the Trust with the residue of 
the Estate. R. 62-63. The Will and the Trust also provided that Trust income be paid to Marge 
without condition, but that the co-trustees "shall also distribute" to Marge "as much of the 
principal as is necessary for her proper health, support, and maintenance and to maintain her in the 
standard of living that she enjoyed during [Grant's] lifetime." R. 62-63. The Will further directed 
that the Trust corpus be distributed to other beneficiaries upon Marge's death. R. 63-64. 
From the date of Grant's death on November 14, 1991, until Marge's death on 
February 27, 1993, Marge served as Personal Representative of the Estate. R. 7, 258. After her 
death, Mr. Mitchell was appointed Successor Personal Representative under the Will and 
continues to function in that capacity. R. 62-64, 258. 
During the fifteen months Marge functioned as Personal Representative of the Estate, she 
never funded the Trust. R. 248, 511. Although she was not entitled to receive money personally 
from the Estate, she nonetheless drew checks on the Estate checking account in the amount of 
$96,642.55 to pay for personal living expenses (the "Checking Account Payments"). R. 281-82, 
351, 355-58. Marge's expenditures were carefully recorded during her life by the accounting 
firm of Grant Thornton. R. 350-71. 
At the date of Grant's death, the value of the Estate was $420,204.64. R. 329-30. At that 
same time, Marge's net worth was $515,455.21. R. 282-283. At the date of Marge's death, the 
value of her estate was at least $522,078.29 while Grant's Estate had been seriously depleted by 
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Marge's withdrawals. R. 282. At the time Grant executed the Will, Marge simultaneously 
executed a will identical to Grant's Will, naming the same devisees and beneficiaries. R 570-71. 
Marge revoked her duplicate will after Grant died. Her new will, currently being probated, named 
as devisees Respondent, Lynda Wood ("Ms. Wood") and her brother and mother, Terry and 
Wanda Short. R. 544. 
On or about May 8, 1993, Mr. Mitchell filed a claim against the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims 
to recover the Checking Account Payments and other funds (the "Claim"). The Claim was denied 
by Ms. Wood, as Personal Representative, on August 18, 1993. R. 17, 47, 161. Mr. Mitchell 
then filed his Petition and First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim and moved the Trial 
Court for summary judgment on the Claim based on the fact that Marge had used money of the 
Estate in contravention of the terms of the Will. R. 50, 207, 345. Ms. Wood also moved for 
summary judgment seeking to disallow the Claim. R. 381. 
The Trial Court granted both motions in part and denied both motions in part. R. 510-15, 
520-22. Specifically, as to the Checking Account Payments, the Trial Court found that it was not 
disputed that Marge had breached her fiduciary duty to fund the Trust. R. 511-12. Nonetheless, 
the Trial Court concluded that the moneys she took from the Estate were funds to which she 
would have been entitled, "as a matter of law," had the Trust been funded. R. 511. As support 
for this conclusion, the Trial Court, without further explanation, found that "the intent of 
Mr. Sims was to benefit his spouse, rather than conserve his Estate for residual beneficiaries." 
R. 511. As such, the Trial Court ruled that the breach was not actionable. R. 511-12. 
6 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court's Order regarding the 
Checking Account Payments. It stated: 
We agree with the trial court's determination that "while there was a technical 
breach of [Marge's] fiduciary responsibilities to fund the bypass trust, the breach 
resulted in no damages and therefore is not actionable." 
918 P.2d at 135. In arriving at this conclusion, however, the Court of Appeals paraphrased the 
relevant testamentary language in such a way as to alter its meaning. It omitted certain words in 
its analysis that made it appear as though the Will placed no restrictions on, and essentially 
mandated, the distribution of Trust principal to Marge. The court reached its holding with little 
or no analysis of Grant's testamentary intent or the effect of the "as is necessary" restriction in the 
Will. 
Mr. Mitchell now seeks review of the Court of Appeals' Opinion. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
The following arguments set forth "special and important reasons," within the meaning of 




BY EXCUSING MARGE'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND 
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND HAS SANCTIONED 
SIMILAR DEPARTURES BY LOWER COURTS 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code imposes fiduciary duties upon personal representatives 
and places them under a duty to strictly adhere to testamentary instructions Utah Code Ann 
§ 75-3-703(1) provides that "A personal representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the 
estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of any probated and effective will and this 
code " (emphasis added) Accordingly, Marge, as personal representative under the Will, was 
under a duty to carry out the terms of the Will with exactness and in conformity with the probate 
code 
Both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that Marge breached that 
fiduciary duty but that the breach was not actionable against her estate The Court of Appeals 
therefore allowed Marge to completely ignore the terms and instructions of the Will The court 
failed to pay deference to Grant's intent, as set forth in clear and unambiguous terms, and it 
excused Marge's breach of fiduciary duty The Court of Appeals sanctioned, in its published 
Opinion, the wholesale disregard for such testamentary instructions It is clear from the terms of 
the Will that Grant intended to benefit not only his spouse, but also the Remainder Beneficiaries 
listed in the Will and Trust The Court of Appeals' Opinion, however, obviated that intent 
Regardless of whatever estate tax planning vehicles or mechanisms employed by testators for the 
benefit of ultimate heirs, beneficiaries, or remaindermen in the future, this Opinion will render 
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such careful planing a nullity by permitting personal representatives to substitute their own 
choices and desires for those of the testator. 
Marge's breach of duty, carried to a logical extreme, could have been far more damaging 
to Grant's Estate and still have been excused under the Opinion. If, for example, she had been 
younger and in better health at the time Grant died, Marge could have left her own assets 
untouched, which she did, and she could have completely exhausted all of Grant's Estate on 
travel entertainment, and luxury purposes. Based on the record, the couple lived "lavishly," and 
she could have justified these expenditures of Grant's Estates' money as "maintaining] her in the 
standard of living that she enjoyed during [Grant's] lifetime." Under the Opinion, that behavior 
would be perfectly acceptable, regardless of the fact that the Trust had never been formed, the co-
trustees had never been appointed, Grant's beneficiaries would be left with nothing, and Marge's 
estate—left untouched-would have grown larger by the day. While Marge did not entirely deplete 
Grant's Estate, she did manage to significantly deplete it during her brief tenure as personal 
representative. In future cases, however, the logical extreme, while completely unfair to similarly 
situated remainder beneficiaries, is foreseeable because the Opinion's analysis is so scant and its 
language so broad. This Court should, therefore, grant certiorari to review the Opinion and 
ensure that such a rule does not become the law of this state and that such an undesirable 
outcome does not occur in the future.. 
Further, the Court of Appeals failed to properly analyze testamentary intent in the 
Opinion. It is a cannon of testamentary construction that courts must look to the four corners of 
the will in order to determine the testator's intent. Where an ambiguity exists, courts are then 
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authorized to examine the surrounding circumstances. Boyle v. National Union Fire Insurance 
Co.. 866 P.2d 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In this case, Mr. Mitchell has argued that the terms of 
the will clearly prohibit Marge's unfettered access to Estate principal. One fact alone—that Grant 
required two co-trustees to control the Trust and make distribution conditioned on Marge's 
necessity—demonstrates that intent. The Court of Appeals made no mention whatsoever of this 
evidence that Grant wished to have another person involved in the decision of which distributions 
of principal, if any, should be made to Marge during her lifetime. Had the Trust been created and 
funded, Marge could not have unilaterally withdrawn the funds as she did. To the extent any 
ambiguities exist as to the meaning and effect of such terms, the Court of Appeals should have 
remanded the matter for further factual determination. 
The Court of Appeals made little or no attempt to analyze these terms or others in the Will 
to ascertain how they reflected Grant's testamentary intent. Because both parties argued that the 
terms had different meaning and effect, the court should have, at the very least, remanded the 
matter to the trial court for further factual determination regarding the circumstances surrounding 
the creation of the Will. The Court of Appeals' failure to correctly determine Grant's intent and 
its failure to attempt to analyze surrounding circumstances should be reviewed by this Court. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED AN IMPORTANT 
QUESTION OF STATE LAW THAT HAS NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE, 
DECIDED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
This appeal presents a question of first impression. Specifically, Utah courts have never 
interpreted the testamentary language at issue here or determined the meaning and effect of the 
instructions that trustees only "distribute as much of the principal as is necessary for proper health 
support and maintenance. . . ." In this case, Marge had abundant personal wealth. None of the 
Trust's principal (had the Trust even been funded) would have been "necessary" for Marge's 
maintenance or support because she could have easily paid for those expenses with her own 
funds. The record reflects that at the time of Grant's death, Marge's personal worth was 
approximately one-half million dollars, which only grew larger until her death. It is therefore 
necessary for this Court to determine if the "as is necessary" language permits or requires a 
personal representative or trustee to examine the beneficiary's independent resources before 
invading principal on their behalf. 
Courts from many other jurisdictions have addressed this issue and have determined that a 
trustee is permitted—and in some cases, required—to examine the beneficiaries' independent 
resources before invading trust principal on their behalf. See, e.g.. Dunklee v. Kettering. 225 
P.2d 853 (Colo. 1950), which is a well-reasoned and well-supported decision on this issue.1 
1The Dunklee court relies upon several similar cases: In re Martin's Will. 199 N.E. 491, 
492 (NY. 1936) ("the private income of the beneficiary must be considered in determining 
whether such need exists"); In re Seacrist's Estate. 66 A.2d 836, 838 (Pa. 1949) ("To know the 
quality and quantity of [the beneficiary's] private estate becomes very material in order to 
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Several courts have held that even if the will instructs that the "trustee shall distribute principal," 
the trustee is entitled to consider the beneficiaries' other assets before making an invasion into the 
principal of the trust.2 This rationale is sound. The trustee has a fiduciary duty to remainder 
beneficiaries and must safeguard their interests against improper access to trust principal. If the 
life beneficiary can easily pay expenses with her own assets, as in this case, then to distribute 
principal to her is contrary to the interests of the remainder beneficiaries and a violation of 
fiduciary responsibility.. 
determine his good faith and his necessities."); Board of Visitors v. Safe Deposit and Trust 
Company. 46 A.2d 280 (Md. Ct. App. 1946) ("circumstances and income of the beneficiary 
should be taken into consideration in determining whether to invade the principal of the trust."); 
Bridgeport City Trust Company v. Beech. 174 A. 308 (Conn. 1934) (holding under similar 
circumstances and testamentary language that, without a showing of need, principal may not be 
invaded.). 
Subsequent to the Dunklee decision, several other jurisdictions analyzed the issue and 
rendered similar holdings. See, e.g.. Sibson v. First National Bank & Trust Company. 165 A.2d 
800 (N.J. Supp. Ct. 1960) ("the separate income of the life tenant must be considered in deter-
mining whether it is necessary to invade corpus."); Security-People's Trust Company v. United 
States. 238 F. Supp. 40 (W.D. Pa. 1965) ("Since there are a series of further life beneficiaries and 
remaindermen, the trustee would be under a strong duty to protect their interests in the face of 
any request of the [wife] for invasion. Under the Pennsylvania decisions, a court would be bound 
to look into the assets of her own estate, which were well known to the trustee, who managed 
them."); N.C.N.B. National Bank of Florida v. Shanaberger. 616 So.2d 96 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993) 
(holding that in order to fulfill fiduciary his obligation, the trustee was required to look at the life 
beneficiary's own assets to determine whether there was a need to invade the principal). 
2See. e.g.. In re Will of Flyer. 245 N.E.2d 718 (N.Y. 1969) (holding that even though the 
trustee had absolute and sole discretion, the testamentary gift of principal was conditioned upon 
the widow's need); Hull v. Holloway. 20 A. 445, 447 (Conn. 1889) ("So long as [the husband] is 
able to support himself. . ., the trustee has no right to pay over to him, . . ., any portion of the 
income or principal of the trust fund."); Stemple v. Middletown Trust Company. 15 A.2d 305 
(Conn. 1940) ("[beneficiary's] personal estate, . . . is to be taken into account by the trustees in 
future payments to her."). 
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This is a significant question of state law, as this language is commonly utilized in 
testamentary instruments. The Court of Appeals' analysis of the provision, however, is 
disappointingly insufficient given the importance of the issue. While the court properly 
characterized many of the facts, it simply glossed over many others. It also misquoted, 
paraphrased, and omitted words from the "as is necessary" restriction in its Opinion. By so doing, 
it altered the syntax, meaning, and effect of the phrase. The analysis, therefore, fits the court's 
ultimate conclusion but does not square with the plain language of the Will. 
One example of this distortion is found on page 4 of the Opinion. After setting forth the 
full language of the provision, the court then paraphrases it as follows: 
The language of the Will clearly states that Mrs. Sims shall receive distributions 
from the principal of Mr. Sims' Estate "necessary for her proper health, support, 
and maintenance." 
918 P.2d at 134. Significantly, the Opinion omits the words "as is," which modify and qualify the 
word "necessary." This omission changes the phrase's meaning entirely and transforms it into an 
unqualified requirement for the trustee to distribute principal to Marge. 
In the next sentence of the Opinion, the court again alters the language of the Will. In 
responding to Mr. Mitchell's argument that the phrase "as is necessary" requires the Trustee to 
consider the beneficiary's independent resources before distributing principal, the court states: 
We need not address that question because Mr. Sims' Will does not merely 
authorize the invasion of the principal for the "necessities of life.". . . Instead, 
Mr. Sims' Will mandates that Mrs. Sims shall have access to the principal "to 
maintain her [Mrs. Sims] in the standard of living that she enjoyed during my 
lifetime." 
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Again, the court omits the phrase "as is necessary" and glosses over the issue. The court's 
rendition of the provision makes it appear that Marge was to have unfettered access to the 
principal of the Trust, which is not what is dictated by the plain language of the Will. Again, the 
alteration fits the court's conclusion, but not the reality of the Will. 
Further, by omitting the "as is necessary" language from the quote and focusing, instead, 
on the "shall distribute" language, the court expressly avoided addressing the core issue of the 
meaning of the phrase "as is necessary" in this context. The court's avoidance of this analytical 
responsibility is improper, particularly in an opinion designated for publication on an issue never 
before addressed by the appellate courts of Utah. Such an issue deserves more careful analysis 
and should therefore be addressed by the Utah Supreme Court. Those individual and corporate 
trustees in Utah who make daily decisions regarding disbursements of funds held in trust based on 
similar language are entitled to the analysis and guidance of this Court to assist them in fulfilling 
their fiduciary duties. 
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XI. CONCLUSION & RELIEF REQUESTED 
Mr. Mitchell respectfully requests that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to the Utah 
Court of Appeals and that it review the Court of Appeals' Opinion in this matter. 
DATED this / / day of August, 1996. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Kim R. Wilson 
David L. Pinkston 
Attorneys for Appellant, Neil R. Mitchell 
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BENCH, Judge: 
Neil Mitchell appeals the trial courtfs entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Marjorie Sims's estate. Lynda Wood cross-
appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
BACKGROUND 
Grant and Marjorie Sims enjoyed a long married life 
together. Mr. Sims died in 1991, leaving a will which provided 
for the creation of a bypass trust and designated Mrs. Sims the 
personal representative of his estate. He also named Mrs. Sims 
and Mitchell co-trustees of the bypass trust, which was to be 
funded from the residue of his estate. The will provided that 
trust income was to be paid to Mrs. Sims, without condition. The 
will further provided that the trustees were required tt 
distribute to Mrs. Sims as much cf the principal as necessary for 
her proper health, support, and maintenance. After Mrs. Sims's 
death, the residue cf the trust's corpus was to be distributed to 
other beneficiaries, including both Mitchell and Weed. 
During the time that Mrs. Sims served as personal 
representative, she never funded the trust. Instead, sr.e 
withdrew 396,642.55 directly from the estate checking account to 
pay for her personal living and rr.edical expenses. Mrs. Sims 
received an additional $52,875.4: from the estate, derived from a 
$50,000 certificate cf deposit plus interest. Finally, Mrs. Sims 
received a $12,445.66 personal injury settlement for injuries Mr. 
Sims had sustained before his death. 
Mrs. Sims died in 1993. Her will named Wood as the personal 
representative cf her estate. Mitchell, as cc-trustee and a 
remainder person of Mr. Sims's estate, filed a claim against Mrs. 
Sims's estate for the monies that Mrs. Sims had removed from Mr. 
Sims's estate. Wood conceded that $48,100 from the certificate 
of deposit in Mr. Sims's name had been wrongfully taken from Mr. 
Sims's estate.1 Mitchell moved for summary judgment for return 
of all the funds removed from Mr. Sims's estate. Wood also filed 
for summary judgment seeking to disallow Mitchell's claim. 
The trial court granted in part and denied in part both 
parties' motions for summary judgment. The trial court found 
that Mrs. Sims had failed to fund the trust, but that she was 
nonetheless entitled to the $96,642.55 from the estate checking 
account. The trial court determined that the funds were used for 
her necessary support and maintenance and that there was 
therefore no damage to Mr. Sims's estate. Regarding the 
certificate of deposit, the trial court found that $48,100 was 
undisputedly owed by Mrs. Sims's estate and crdered that amount 
paid to Mr. Sims's estate plus 10% interest. The trial court 
also allowed Mrs. Sims's estate to retain the $2875.40 in 
interest income from the certificate of deposit and the $1900 
claimed as personal representative fees. Finally, the trial 
court found that Mrs. Sims's acceptance of the $12,445.36 
personal injury settlement was an improper diversion of the money 
from Mr. Sims's estate and awarded that amount to Mr. Sims's 
estate. 
Mitchell appeals from the trial court's decision concerning 
the $96,642.55 that Mrs. Sims withdrew from the estate checking 
1. Wood argued that Mrs. Sims's estate was entitled tc the 
$2875.40 in interest and an additional $1900 as personal 
representative fees. 
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a c c o u n t and t h e a l lowance of i n t e r e s t income and p e r s o n a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f e e s from t h e c e r t i f i c a t e of d e p o s i t . Weed c r o s s -
a p p e a l s t he t r i a l c o u r t ' s summary judgment in f a v o r of Mr. S i m s ' s 
e s t a t e on t h e p e r s o n a l i n j u r y s e t t l e m e n t amount and award of 
i n t e r e s t . 
STANDARD CF REVIEW 
Summary judgment i s a p p r o p r i a t e o n l y when no genuine i s s u e s 
of m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t and t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d to 
judement as a m a t t e r of law. Utah R. C i v . ? . 5 6 ( c ) ; Ki rg ins v . 
S a l t Lake County . 855 P.2d 2 3 1 , 225 (Utah 1553) . Because 
e n t i t l e m e n t t o summary judgment i s a q u e s t i o n of l aw , we a c c o r d 
no d e f e r e n c e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e s o l u t i o n of t h e l e g a l i s s u e s 
p r e s e n t e d . I d . : F e r r - e v . S t a t e . 784 P .2d 145, 151 (Utah 1989) . 
ANALYSIS 
A. Estate Checking Account 
Mitchell first argues that the trial court erred when it 
allowed Mrs. Sims's estate to keep the $96,642.55 that Mrs. Sims 
had drawn from the checking account of Mr. Sims's estate. 
Mitchell contends that because Mrs. Sims did not fund the trust 
provided for in Mr. Sims's will, she must return all the money to 
Mr. bims's estate. We disagree. 
Mr. Sims declared in his will that 
[t]he Trustees shall distribute to her [Mrs. 
Sims] without any conditions, all of the 
income of said trust. The trustees shall 
also distribute as much of the principal as 
is necessary for her proper health, support, 
and maintenance and to maintain her in the 
standard of living that she enjoyed during my 
lifetime. 
The trial court found that although Mrs. Sims did not fund the 
trust, she was entitled to the funds since they were used for her 
support and maintenance. The record reflects that Mrs. Sims 
spent approximately 576,000 from the estate's checking account on 
her medical expenses. The balance of the money drawn" from the 
estate's checking account was for Mrs. Sims's living expenses. 
The accounting report and affidavit of the accountant for Mr. 
Sims's estate confirm these expenses. Mitchell did not dispute 
Mrs. Sims's expenses, contending merely that the expense 
accounting was irrelevant because any money used was "irmsroperly 
950734-CA 3 
converted from the estate." Because Mitchell did net challenge 
Mrs. Sims's expenses below, he is precluded frcm challenging them 
on appeal. Jensen v. Sowcut. 892 ?.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 
App.)(holding acquiescence to opposing argument before trial 
court precluded challenge on appeal), cert, denied. 895 ?.2d 1231 
(Utah 1995); see alsc Salt Lake*City v. Ohms. 381 P.2d 544, 847 
(Utah 1994! (stating court will review only those issues 
presented below unless exceptional circumstances or plain error 
are shown; .' 
The language of the will clearly states that Mrs. Sims shall 
receive distributions from the principal of Mr. Sims's estate 
"necessary for her prccer heath, support, and maintenance." 
Mitchell argues that, in other jurisdictions, the use of "as is 
necessary" language requires the beneficiaries of a trust to 
exhaust their own resources before invadinc trust principal. See 
Sunklgg v. Ketterinc. 225 P.2d 853, 855-57* (Colo. 1950)." But see 
In re Estate of Lincrren. 885 P.2d 1280, 12S2-S3 (Mont. 1994). 
We need net address that question because Mr. Sims's will does 
not merely authorize the invasion of the principal for "the 
necessities of life." Dunklee, 225 P.2d at S53. Instead, Mr. 
Sims's will mandates that Mrs. Sims shall have access tc the 
principal "to maintain her [Mrs. Sims] in the standard cf living 
that she enjoyed during my lifetime." Therefcre^ we agree with 
the trial court's determination that "while there was a technical 
breach of her fiduciary responsibilities tc fund the bypass 
trusty the breach resulted in no damages and therefore is not 
actionable." 
E. Certificate of Deposit 
Mitchell challenges the trial court's award to Mrs. Sims's 
estate of S1900 in personal representative fees and $2875.40 that 
Mrs. Sims claimed as interest earned from Mr. Sims's $50,000 
certificate of deposit. Mitchell first argues that Mrs. Sims's 
estate did not properly petition the trial court for the $1900 in 
claimed personal•representative fees pursuant to Utah Cede Ann. § 
75-3-718(1) (1993) . Wood stated in her Memorandum in Response to 
Mitchell's Motion for Summary Judgment that she deducted from the 
$50,000 "$1900 as fees for acting as personal representative." 
We need not decide whether this qualifies as a proper claim 
2. Mitchell also claims that Wood should be estopped from 
claiming Mrs. Sims's estate had no liability towards Mr. Sims's 
estate. Mitchell concedes that estoppel is a new argument but 
contends that it is not a new issue. However, "[w]e decline to 
honor such a distinction." One Int'1 (U.S.A.i Inc. v. llth Ave. 
Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455 n.31 (Utah 1993). Consequently, we will 
not address the estcccel issue. 
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pursuant to section 75-3-718(1),. since Wood provided r.c evidence 
to support the fees after Mitchell challenged them on summary 
judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 5£ !c) . Consequently, we reverse 
that portion of the award. 
Mitchell also asserts that the trial court improperly 
awarded Mrs. Sims's estate $2875.40 in claimed interest from the 
certificate of deposit. Wood argues that the money was interest 
earned from the certificate of deposit in Mr. Sims's name and 
that, since Mr. Sims's will declared Mrs. Sims the beneficiary of 
all income from Mr. Sims's estate, she was entitled to >eep the 
interest earned. Mitchell simply contends that because the trust 
was not funded, Mrs. Sims did net have the right to keep that 
money. We disagree. Again, although Mrs. Sims did net fund the 
trust as Mr. Sims's will directed, Mr. Sims explicitly stated 
that Mrs. Sims was to receive the income from Mr. Sims's estate 
"without condition." Thus, the trial court properly allowed Mrs. 
Sims's estate to retain the interest from the certificate of 
deposit. 
C. Settlement Proceeds 
Wood cross-appeals the trial court's order to return to Mr. 
Sims's estate the $12,445.86 received from the settlement of Mr. 
Sims's personal injury claim. Weed argues that since Mrs. Sims 
claims to have paid a large portion of Mr. Sims's medical 
expenses, Mrs. Sims could retain the settlement proceeds pursuant 
to Ufekh's survival statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 
(1992). Utah's survival statute provides: 
If prior to judgment or settlement the 
injured person dies as a result of a cause 
other than the injury received as a result of 
the wrongful act or negligence of the 
wrongdoer, the personal representative or 
heirs of that person are entitled to receive 
no more than the out-of-pocket expenses 
incurred by or on behalf of that injured 
person as the result of his injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) (b) (1992) . According to Utah's 
survival statute, Mrs. Sims could only recover the personal 
injury settlement in her capacity as personal representative of 
Mr. Sims's estate. Wood's reliance on In re Behm's Est—e, 117 
Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (1950) for the argument that she is 
entitled to the settlement proceeds is misplaced. Behn is a 
wrongful death case and not a personal injury settlement case. 
In a wrongful death cause of action, the heirs of the decedent 
personally hold claims for lost support and other personal 
losses. See Haro v. Haro. 887 P.2df878, 879 (Utah App. 1994). 
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In a personal injury case, by comparison, the cause of action is 
owned not by the heirs, but by the injured party. As personal 
representative of Mr. Sims's estate, Mrs. Sims was therefore 
authorized to receive the settlement only en behalf of his 
estate. Mrs. Sims could then present a claim to his estate for 
out-of-pocket expenses, pursuant to the survival statute. She 
has never done that.3 We therefore affirm the trial court's 
award of the settlement proceeds to Mr. Sims's estate. 
We have considered the other issues raised, and we adjudge 
them to be without merit. Accordingly, we do not address them. 
£££ Stat* v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) ("Court need 
not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue 
or claim-raised."), cert, denied."lis S. Ct. 163' (1995;. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the order of the trial court except as to the 
award of SLrOO in personal representative fees. That portion of 
the judgment is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial 
court for entry of a new judgment consistent with this opinion. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
3- Mrs. Sims'.s estate argues that because she was Mr. Sims's 
"only surviving intestate heir, " she is entitled to the 
settlement proceeds. However, it is evident that Mr. Sims did 
not die intestate. He had a will that designated Mrs. Sims as 
the personal representative, and devisee of personal property. 
Thus, she could not take the settlement as an intestate heir. 
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In the Matter of the ESTATE OF 
Marjorie S. SIMS, Deceased. 
Neil MITCHELL, Appellant 
and Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
Lynda WOOD, Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant. 
No. 950734-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 16, 1996. 
Co-trustee and remainderman of dece^ 
dent's husband's estate brought claim 
against decedent's estate for monies removed 
from husband's estate. Co-trustee and re-
mainderman and personal representative for 
decedent's estate cross-moved for summary 
judgment. The District Court, Third Dis-
trict, Salt Lake County, Timothy R. Hanson> 
J., granted in part and denied in part both 
motions. Parties cross-appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) dece-
dent's estate was not required to remit to 
husband's estate funds decedent had with-
drawn from husband's estate's checking ac-
count; (2) decedent's estate was not entitled 
to personal representative fee award from 
husband's estate; (3) decedent's estate was 
entitled to retain interest earned on certifi-
cate of deposit that had been part of hus-
band's estate; and (4) decedent was not enti-
tled to receive settlement from testator's 
personal injury claim. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=>842(1) 
Inasmuch as entitlement to summary 
judgment is question of law, reviewing court 
accords no deference to trial court's resolu-
tion of legal issues presented. 
2. Executors and Administrators @=>81 
Although personal representative's fail-
ure to fund husband's testamentary trust 
with estate residue was technical breach of 
quired to remit to husband's estate fimdg 
personal representative withdrew from hu$. 
band's estate checking account, given wiD 
provision that personal representative w& 
entitled to trust principal as needed for her 
medical and living expenses and trial court's 
finding that withdrawn funds were used for 
personal representative's support and main-
tenance. 
3. Executors and Administrators (3=5256(4) 
Trust residuary beneficiary, whose claim 
against settlor's surviving spouse's estate for 
monies she removed from settlor's estate was 
denied, was precluded on appeal of that deni-
al from challenging medical and living ex-
penses of spouse, who, pursuant to settlors 
will, was entitled to distributions of tros 
principal to extent required for such ex-
penses, by his failure to challenge expenses 
below. 
4. Appeal and Error <3=>170(1) 
Appellate court would not address estop-
pel argument raised for first time on appeal, 
despite appellant's contention that issue was 
not new even though argument was. 
5. Executors and Administrators <2>501 
Judgment <S=>185.3(1) 
Estate of personal representative of tes-
tator's estate was not entitled to personal 
representative fee award from testator's es-
tate when personal representative's estate 
failed to provide evidence to support award 
after co-trustee and residuary beneficiary d 
testator's testamentary trust challenged fees 
on summary judgment. Rules Civ.Proc 
Rule 56(e). 
6. Executors and Administrators <s=*313 
. Interest earned on certificate of deporf 
that was part of testator's estate was prop** 
ly retained by testator's spouse's estate, ei* 
though spouse, as personal representatfl* 
had failed to fund testator's testaments 
trust, given will provision granting spofl* 
right to receive estate's income without c * 
dition. 
7. Executors and Administrators @^ 49 
Testator's surviving spouse, who *R 
served as personal representative of h* 5 ^ 
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testator's personal injury claim on ground 
that she paid large portion of testator's medi-
cal expenses; under survival statute, spouse 
could recover settlement only in her capacity 
as personal representative on behalf of es-
tate, and could then present claim to estate 
for out-of-pocket expenses. U.CA1953, 78-
ll-12(l)(b). 
8. Death ®=>7 
In wrongful death cause of action, heirs 
of decedent personally hold claims for lost 
support and other personal losses, while in 
personal injury case, cause of action is owned 
not by heirs, but by injured party. 
9. Descent and Distribution <3=>45 
Testator's surviving spouse could not 
take testator's personal injury settlement as 
testator's only surviving intestate heir; testa-
tor, who had will that designated spouse as 
personal representative and de^see oi per-
sonal property, did not die intestate. 
John E. Gates, Kim R. Wilson, and David 
L. Pinkston, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
and Cross-Appellee. 
John L. McCoy, Salt Lake City, for Appel-
lee and Cross-appellant. 




Neil Mitchell appeals the trial court's entry 
of &\itw3\arY yid^xveut \sv toot ot Maryrc\£ 
Sims's estate. Lynda Wood cross-appeals. 
We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
BACKGROUND 
Grant and Marjorie Sims enjoyed a long 
married life together. Mr. Sims died in 
1991, leaving a will which provided for the 
creation of a bypass trust and designated 
Mrs. Sims the personal representative of his 
estate. He also named Mrs. Sims and Mitch-
ell co-trustees of the bypass trust, which was 
1. Wood argued that Mrs. Sims's estate was enti-
tled to the $2875.40 in interest and an additional 
to be funded from the residue of his estate. 
The will provided that trust income was to be 
paid to Mrs. Sims, without condition. The 
will further provided that the trustees were 
required to distribute to Mrs. Sims as much 
of the principal as necessary for her proper 
health, support, and maintenance. After 
Mrs. Sims's death, the residue of the trust's 
corpus was to be distributed to other benefi-
ciaries, including both Mitchell and Wood. 
During the time that Mrs. Sims served as 
personal representative, she never funded 
the trust. Instead, she withdrew $96,642.55 
directly from the estate checking account to 
pay for her personal living and medical ex-
penses. Mrs. Sims received an additional 
$52,875.40 from the estate, derived from a 
$50,000 certificate of deposit plus interest. 
Finally, Mrs. Sims received a $12,445.86 per-
sonal injury settlement for injuries Mr. Sims 
"had sustained "before "his death. 
Mrs. Sims died in 1993. Her will named 
Wood as the personal representative of her 
estate. Mitchell, as co-trustee and a remain-
der person of Mr. Sims's estate, filed a claim 
against Mrs. Sims's estate for the monies 
that Mrs. Sims had removed from Mr. Sims's 
estate. Wood conceded that $48,100 from 
the certificate of deposit in Mi\ Sims's name 
had been wrongfully taken from Mr. Sims's 
estate.1 Mitchell moved for summary judg-
ment for return of all the funds removed 
from Mr. Sims's estate. Wood also filed for 
summary judgment seeking to disallow 
Mitchell's claim. 
The trial court granted in part and denied 
in part "both parties* motions for summary 
judgment. The trial court found that Mrs. 
Sims had failed to fund the trust, but that 
she was nonetheless entitled to the $96,-
642.55 from the estate checking account. 
The trial court determined that the funds 
were used for her necessary support and 
maintenance and that there was therefore no 
damage to Mr. Sims's estate. Regarding the 
certificate of deposit, the trial court found 
that $48,100 was undisputedly owed by Mrs. 
Sims's estate and ordered that amount paid 
$1900 as personal representative fees. 
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to Mr. Sims's estate plus 10% interest. The 
trial court also allowed Mrs. Sims's estate to 
retain the $2875.40 in interest income from 
the certificate of deposit and the $1900 
claimed as personal representative fees. Fi-
nally, the trial court found that Mrs. Sims's 
acceptance of the $12,445.86 personal injury 
settlement was an improper diversion of the 
money from Mr. Sims's estate and awarded 
that amount to Mr. Sims's estate. 
Mitchell appeals from the trial court's deci-
sion concerning the $96,642.55 that Mrs. 
Sims withdrew from the estate checking ac-
count and the allowance of interest income 
and personal representative fees from the 
certificate of deposit. Wood cross-appeals 
the trial court's summary judgment in favor 
of Mr. Sims's estate on the personal injury 
settlement amount and award of interest. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] Summary judgment is appropriate 
only when no genuine issues of material fact 
exist and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Because entitle-
ment to summary judgment is a question of 
law, we accord no deference to the trial 
court's resolution of the legal issues present-
ed. Id; Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 
(Utah 1989). 
ANALYSIS 
A. Estate Checking Account 
[2] Mitchell first argues that the trial 
court erred when it allowed Mrs. Sims's es-
tate to keep the $96,642.55 that Mrs. Sims 
had drawn from the checking account of Mr. 
Sims's estate. Mitchell contends that be-
cause Mrs. Sims did not fund the trust pro-
vided for in Mr. Sims's will, she must return 
all the money to Mr. Sims's estate. We 
disagree. 
[3,4] Mr. Sims declared in his will that 
2. Mitchell also claims that Wood should be es-
topped from claiming Mrs. Sims's estate had no 
liability towards Mr. Sims's estate. Mitchell con-
[t]he Trustees shall distribute to her [Mrs. 
Sims] without any conditions, all of the 
income of said trust. The trustees shall 
also distribute as much of the principal as 
is necessary for her proper health, sup. 
port, and maintenance and to maintain her 
in the standard of living that she enjoyed 
during my lifetime. 
The trial court found that although Mrs. 
Sims did not fund the trust, she was entitled 
to the funds since they were used for her 
support and maintenance. The record re-
flects that Mrs. Sims spent approximately 
$76,000 from the estate's checking account on 
her medical expenses. The balance of the 
money drawn from the estate's checking ac-
count was for Mrs. Sims's living expenses. 
The accounting report and affidavit of the 
accountant for Mr. Sims's estate confirm 
these expenses. Mitchell did not dispute 
Mrs. Sims's expenses, contending merely 
that the expense accounting was irrelevant 
because any money used was "improperly 
converted from the estate." Because Mitch-
ell did not challenge Mrs. Sims's expenses 
below, he is precluded from challenging them 
on appeal. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 
1056 (Utah App.)(holding acquiescence to op-
posing argument before trial court precluded 
challenge on appeal), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 
1231 (Utah 1995); see also Salt Lake City v. 
Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994) (stating 
court will review only those issues presented 
below unless exceptional circumstances or 
plain error are shown).2 
The language of the will clearly states that 
Mrs. Sims shall receive distributions from 
the principal of Mr. Sims's estate "necessary 
for her proper health, support, and mainte-
nance." Mitchell argues that, in other juris-
dictions, the use of "as is necessary" lan-
guage requires the beneficiaries of a trust to 
exhaust their own resources before invading 
trust principal. See Dunklee v. Ketteringt 
123 Colo. 43, 225 P.2d 853, 855-57 (1950). 
But see In re Estate of Lindgren, 268 Mont. 
96, 885 P.2d 1280, 1282-83 (1994). We need 
not address that question because Mr. Sims's 
decline to honor such a distinction." Ong Int'l 
(U.SA.) Inc. v..11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 
n. 31 (Utah 1993). Consequently, we will not 
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will does not merely authorize the invasion of 
the principal for "the necessities of life." 
Dunklee, 225 P.2d at 853. Instead, Mr. 
Sims's will mandates that Mrs. Sims shall 
have access to the principal "to maintain her 
[Mrs. Simsl in the standard of living that she 
enjoyed during my lifetime." Therefore, we 
agree with the trial court's determination 
that "while there was a technical breach of 
her fiduciary responsibilities to fund the by-
pass trust, the breach resulted in no damages 
and therefore is not actionable." 
B. Certificate of Deposit 
[5] Mitchell challenges the trial court's 
award to Mrs. Sims's estate of $1900 in per-
sonal representative fees and $2875.40 that 
Mrs. Sims claimed as interest earned from 
Mr. Sims's $50,000 certificate of deposit. 
Mitchell first argues that Mrs. Sims's estate 
did not properly petition the trial court for 
the $1900 in claimed personal representative 
fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-
718(1) (1993). Wood stated in her Memoran-
dum in Response to Mitchell's Motion for 
Summary Judgment that she deducted from 
the $50,000 u$1900 as fees for acting as per-
sonal representative." We need not decide 
whether this qualifies as a proper claim pur-
suant to section 75-3-718(1), since Wood pro-
vided no evidence to support the fees after 
Mitchell challenged them on summary judg-
ment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Conse-
quently, we reverse that portion of the 
award. 
[6] Mitchell also asserts that the trial 
court improperly awarded Mrs. Sims's estate 
$2875.40 in claimed interest from the certifi-
cate of deposit. Wood argues that the mon-
ey was interest earned from the certificate of 
deposit in Mr. Sims's name and that, since 
Mr. Sims's will declared Mrs. Sims the bene-
ficiary of all income from Mr. Sims's estate, 
she was entitled to keep the interest earned. 
Mitchell simply contends that because the 
trust was not funded, Mrs. Sims did not have 
the right to keep that money. We disagree. 
Again, although Mrs. Sims did not fund the 
trust as Mr. Sims's will directed, Mr. Sims 
3. Mrs. Sims's estate argues that because she was 
Mr. Sims's "only surviving intestate heir " *h* « 
explicitly stated that Mrs. Sims was to re-
ceive the income from Mr. Sims's estate 
"without condition." Thus, the trial court 
properly allowed Mrs. Sims's estate to retain 
the interest from the certificate of deposit. 
C. Settlement Proceeds 
[7-9] Wood cross-appeals the trial court's 
order to return to Mr. Sims's estate the 
$12,445.86 received from the settlement of 
Mr. Sims's personal injury claim. Wood ar-
gues that since Mrs. Sims claims to have paid 
a large portion of Mr. Sims's medical ex-
penses, Mrs. Sims could retain the settle-
ment proceeds pursuant to Utah's survival 
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 
(1992). Utah's survival statute provides: 
If prior to judgment or settlement the 
injured person dies as a result of a cause 
other than the injury received as a result 
of the wrongful act or negligence of the 
wrongdoer, the personal representative or 
heirs of that person are entitled to receive 
no more than the out-of-pocket expenses 
incurred by or on behalf of that injured 
person as the result of his injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-ll-12(l)(b) (1992). 
According to Utah's survival statute, Mrs. 
Sims could only recover the personal injury 
settlement in her capacity as personal repre-
sentative of Mr. Sims's estate. Wood's reli-
ance on In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 
213 P.2d 657 (1950) for the argument that 
she is entitled to the settlement proceeds is 
misplaced. Behm is a wrongful death case 
and not a personal injury settlement case. 
In a wrongful death cause of action, the heirs 
of the decedent personally hold claims for 
lost support and other personal losses. See 
Haro v. Haro, 887 P.2d 878, 879 (Utah App. 
1994). In a personal injury case, by compari-
son, the cause of action is owned not by the 
heirs, but by the injured party. As personal 
representative of Mr. Sims's estate, Mrs. 
Sims was therefore authorized to receive the 
settlement only oh behalf of his estate. Mrs. 
Sims could then present a claim to his estate 
for out-of-pocket expenses, pursuant to the 
survival statute. She has never done that.3 
is evident that Mr. Sims did not die intestate. 
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We therefore affirm the trial court's award of 
the settlement proceeds to Mr. Sims's estate. 
We have considered the other issues 
raised, and we adjudge them to be without 
merit. Accordingly, we do not address them. 
See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 
1989) ("Court need not analyze and address 
in writing each and every argument, issue or 
claim raised."), cert denied, — U.S. , 
116 S.Ct. 163,133 L.Ed.2d 105 (1995). 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the order of the trial court 
except as to the award of $1900 in personal 
representative fees. That portion of the 
judgment is reversed. The case is remanded 
to the trial court for entry of a new judgment 
consistent with this opinion. 
DAVIS, Associate P.J., and JACKSON, J., 
concur. 
Jfi\ 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Lewis Ricky YATES, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 950444-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 23, 1996. 
Defendant was convicted of class A mis-
demeanor theft, following plea agreement be-
fore the Third District Court, Salt Lake City, 
Leslie A. Lewis, J. Defendant appealed his 
sentence. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., 
held that: (1) defendant was required to be 
sentenced pursuant to statute amended fol-
lowing entry of plea agreement but prior to 
his actual sentencing, and (2) defendant's 
failure to appear for sentencing did not affect 
his entitlement to lesser punishment set 
forth in amended statute. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bench, J., concurred in result only, with 
opinion. 
1. Criminal Law <3=>1134(3) 
Whether defendant is entitled to lesser 
sentence when legislature reduces penalty 
for crime charged after conviction but before 
sentencing is question of law, to be reviewed 
by Court of Appeals for correctness accord-
ing no deference to trial court's conclusions. 
2. Criminal Law <s=>1134(3) 
Whether defendant's dilatory conduct af-
fects his entitlement to lesser sentence is 
question of law, to be reviewed by Court of 
Appeals for correctness according no defer-
ence to trial court's conclusions. 
3. Criminal Law <3=>1134(6) 
Appellate court may affirm decision of 
trial court on any proper ground. 
4. Criminal Law e=>1130(5) 
State's failure to cite to any helpful au-
thority in support of its contention that re-
sentencing defendant, convicted of class A 
misdemeanor theft following plea agreement, 
pursuant to statute amended following entry 
of agreement but prior to actual sentencing 
deprived state of benefit of its bargain under 
contract theory precluded Court of Appeals 
from considering such argument for first 
time on appeal. 
5. Criminal Law <S=>1206.3(2) 
Defendants are entitled to benefit of 
lesser penalty afforded by amended statute 
made effective subsequent to their commis-
sion of offense and prior to their sentencing; 
punishment is imposed as deterrent to crime, 
as means of removing offender as harm from 
society, and as means of rehabilitation of 
offender, and not as punishment, and if legis-
lature finds reduction in the penalty for given 
crime necessary and appropriate to meet 
those goals, then lesser penalty should be 
granted to all defendants sentenced subse-
quent to modification. 
property. Thus, she could not take the settle- ment as an intestate heir. 
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Utah Court of Appeals 
JUL 1 9 1996 
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Clerk of the Court 
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Case No. 950734-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellant and Cross-
appellee's petition for rehearing, filed May 16, 1996. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is 
denied. 
^duco. ufuo v > day ul uu-i-y, -L^^O . 
FOR THE COURT: 
Marilyn M.Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on July 19, 1996, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
John E. Gates 
Kim R. Wilson 
David L. Pinkston 
Snow, Christensen, & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
John L. McCoy 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
Third District Court 
Attn: Appeals Clerk 
451 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dated this July 19, 1996. 
Robin Hutcheson 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 950734-CA 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Case No. 933900278 ES 
APPENDIX "B" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
OF: 
: CASE NO. 933900278 
MARJORIE S. SIMS, 
Deceased. 
The above-referenced matter is before the Court on reciprocal 
Motions for Summary Judgment. The petitioner, Neil Mitchell, as 
successor personal representative of the Estate of G. Grant Sims, 
originally filed his Motion for Summary Judgment seeking an Order 
from this Court that the original personal representative of the 
Estate of G. Grant Sims, prior to her demise, failed to act in 
accordance with Mr. Sims' Will in funding a bypass trust, and was 
therefore required to return to Mr. Sims' Estate certain funds 
which the petitioner believes were inappropriately used by Mrs. 
Sims. Inasmuch as Mrs. Sims is deceased, the petitioner seeks 
repayment from the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims. 
The Estate of Marjorie S. Sims, through its personal 
representative Lynda Wood, has filed in response to the 
aforementioned Motion for Summary Judgment, a counter Motion for 
Summary Judgment seeking from this Court an Order that the Estate 
of G. Grant Sims is not entitled to repayment of sums used by Mrs. 
Sims during her lifetime in her capacity as personal representative 
SIMS ESTATE PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
of Mr, Sims' Estate. The Estate of Marjorie S. Sims does agree, 
however, that certain cash funds retained by Mrs. Sims while she 
was acting as personal representative of the Estate of Mr. Sims 
should be returned and has offered to return $48,100 of the 
$52,875.4 0 that the petitioner claimed was not deposited into Mr. 
Sims' Estate accounts. The difference between the $48,100 and the 
$52,875.40 are outlined in the Memoranda filed by Mr. McCoy on 
behalf of Lynda Wood, personal representative of the Marjorie S. 
Sims Estate, and have not been challenged as being inappropriate by 
the petitioner. 
While it is without dispute in this matter that Mrs. Sims as 
personal representative did not fund the trust as her deceased 
husband's Will provided, the manner in which she used the funds 
were, as a matter of law, funds that she would have been entitled 
to receive had she funded the trust as Mr. Sims' Will provided. The 
terms of the trust would have allowed Mrs. Sims to receive the 
funds she took, without any depletion of her own funds. 
Accordingly, while there was a technical breach of her fiduciary 
responsibilities to fund the bypass trust, the breach resulted in 
no damages and therefore is not actionable. 
The intent of Mr. Sims was to benefit his spouse, rather than 
conserve his Estate for residual beneficiaries. That purpose was 
SIMS ESTATE PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
adhered to by Mrs. Sims, albeit not in strict compliance with the 
formal procedures his Will required. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court determines that the Estate 
of Marjorie Sims has no obligation to repay the Estate of G. Grant 
Sims, with the exception of the $48,100 which the personal 
representative of Marjorie Sims has offered to return heretofore. 
As those funds should properly be with the Estate of Grant Sims, 
the Estate of Marjorie Sims is to repay that amount to his Estate 
forthwith. 
There is a question regarding funds received by Mrs. Sims in 
her capacity as personal representative of Mr. Sims' Estate for 
personal injury and a subsequent settlement after Mr. Sims died. 
The evidence is undisputed that the personal injury claim arose 
before Mr. Sims' death, but was settled after his death. The 
applicable statutory provisions provide that the only claims that 
survive a death are claims for expenses related to the injury, 
where the death of the personal injury claimant is not related to 
the personal injury claim. The settlement was for $12,445.86, and 
as it was received after the death of Mr. Sims, it was for actual 
expenses incurred by Mr. Sims as a result of the personal injury, 
and pursuant to statute is required to be paid over to the personal 
representative of the deceased's (Mr. Sims') Estate, or the heirs 
SIMS ESTATE PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
of the deceased if a death was intestate. As Mr. Sims did not die 
intestate, the funds were properly paid to Mrs. Sims in her 
capacity as personal representative, and should have been deposited 
in the accounts for the Estate, the funds representing expenses 
incurred personally by Mr. Sims as a result of the personal injury 
case. 
Accordingly, the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims is also required 
to repay the Estate of G. Grant Sims the sum of $12,445,86, 
representing an improper diversion of the personal injury 
settlement funds received by Mrs. Sims after her husband's death. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court has granted the Summary 
Judgment of the petitioner, Neil Mitchell, in part as it relates to 
the personal injury settlement funds, and has granted the Summary 
Judgment of the personal representative of the Marjorie S. Sims 
Estate in part. The Court determines that the amounts to be paid 
from Marjorie S. Sims Estate to the G. Grant Sims Estate of $48,100 
is not subject to this Summary Judgment, even though the Order 
should contain a requirement for such payment based upon the fact 
that said sums have been offered and outstanding for some 
substantial period of time and have not really been at issue. 
Counsel for the parties are to confer and determine the manner 
in which an appropriate Order encompassing the decisions of this 
SIMS ESTATE PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Court on the reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment can be 
drafted. Inasmuch as the Court has partially granted each Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the Order needs to provide that an approval 
as to form, or the participation in the preparation of an Order 
encompassing the Court's rulings on these reciprocal Motions for 
Summary Judgment does not constitute a waiver of either side to 
object and pursue an appropriate appeal in relation to the Court's 
ruling contained in the Order. 
Once the Order has been properly prepared and approved by both 
sides as being reflective of this Court's decision, the same should 
be submitted to the Court for its reviey'and signature pursuant to 
the Code of Judicial Administration. 
Dated this /J^dav of March/ 1995. 
'TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS ISA TRUE COPY OF AW 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON RIH IN THE THIRO 
DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH. 
JE^Ojv— 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
lis /C_J 
March, 1995: 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, thi A*J_ day of 
John L. McCoy 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
Lynda Wood 
310 S. Main, Suite 1305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
John E. Gates 
Kim R. Wilson 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
Neil Mitchell 
10 Exchange Place, llth Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
JOHN E. GATES (A1169) 
KIM R. WILSON (A3512) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Neil R. Mitchell, Successor 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of G. Grant Sims 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Of 
MARJORIE S. SIMS, Probate No. 933900278 ES 
Timothy R. Hanson 
Deceased. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of Neil R. Mitchell 
("Mitchell"), as Successor Personal Representative of the Estate 
of G. Grant Sims (the "Motion for Summary Judgment") seeking 
allowance of Mitchell's First Amended Petition for Allowance of 
Claim and the Motion for Summary Judgment of Lynda Wood as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims (the 
"Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment") 'seeking denial of Mitchell's 
First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim came on for hearing 
pursuant to notice, before the above-entitled court, the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, on January 13, 1995, at 
2:00 p.m. and Kim R. Wilson appeared for Mitchell and John L. 
McCoy appeared for Wood, and the Court having considered the 
.T^ JueficWD/stric,' 
motions, the memoranda and affidavits supporting and opposing the 
motions and the files and records herein, having heard arguments 
of counsel, having issued its Memorandum Decision dated March 13, 
1995, which is incorporated herein by reference, and being fully 
advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Mitchell's entitlement to payment of the sum of 
$48,100,00 is not contested, and Wood, be and the same is hereby 
directed to forthwith pay to Mitchell the sum of $48,100.00 
together with interest thereon from August 27, 1993, until paid 
at the statutory rate of 10% per annum. 
2. The Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and 
denied in part. 
3. The Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in 
part and denied in part. 
4. In addition to the amounts provided in Paragraph 1, 
Mitchell's claim is approved and allowed in the sum of $12,445.86 
and Wood is directed to forthwith pay to Mitchell the sum of 
$12,445.86 together with interest thereon from August 27, 1993, 
until paid, at the statutory rate of 10% per annum. 
5. Recovery is denied for all other amounts sought in 
Mitchell's First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim. 
-2-
6. In accordance with Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the court determines that there is no just reason for 
delay, and this Order is deemed to be a f*nal judgment. 
DATED this of) day of QLA/U 
BY THE COURT/V.^LlO"/, V-
'+' * 
» 3 J « . » / imothy R. Hansojv^^o ^ 
Dis t r i c t court Judg^..~-^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEW>* M^TINEAU 
:orneys for Neil R. Mitchell, 
Successor Personal Representative 
of the Estate of G. Grant Sims 
n L. McCoy y 
ttorney for Lynda WoocJ^ r Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of Marjorie S/'Sims 
DWTOCT ecus,. t^rCuJ^iSy- & 5 
OP UTAH. 




75-3-703 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
75-3-703, General duties — Relation and liability to per-
sons interested in estate — Standing to sue. 
( D A personal representative is a fiduciary who shall observe the standard 
of care applicable to trustees as described by Section 75-7-302. A personal 
representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the dece-
dent in accordance with the terms of any probated and effective will and this 
code and as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best inter-
ests of the estate. He shall use the authority conferred upon him by this code, 
the terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings to which he is party 
for the best interests of successors to the estate. 
(2) A personal representative shall not be surcharged for acts of adminis-
tration or distribution if the conduct in question was authorized at the time. 
Subject to other obligations of administration, an informally probated will is 
authority to administer and distribute the estate according to its terms. An 
order of appointment of a personal representative, whether issued in informal 
or formal proceedings, is authority to distribute apparently intestate assets to 
the heirs of the decedent if, at the time of distribution, the personal represen-
tative is not aware of a pending testacy proceeding, a proceeding to vacate an 
order entered in an earlier testacy proceeding, a formal proceeding question-
ing his appointment or fitness to continue, or a supervised administration 
proceeding. Nothing in this section affects the duty of the personal representa-
tive to administer and distribute the estate in accordance with the rights of 
claimants, the surviving spouse, any minor and dependent children, and any 
pretermitted child of the decedent as described elsewhere in this code. 
(3) Except as to proceedings which do not survive the death of the decedent, 
a personal representative of a decedent domiciled in this state at his death has 
the same standing to sue and be sued in the courts of this state and courts of 
any other jurisdiction as his decedent had immediately prior to death. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-703, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 4. 
Editorial Board Comment. — This and the 
next section are especially important sections 
for they state the basic theory underlying the 
duties and powers of personal representatives. 
Whether or not a personal representative is su-
pervised, this section applies to describe the 
relationship he bears to interested parties. If a 
supervised representative is appointed, or if 
supervision of a previously appointed personal 
representative is ordered, an additional obliga-
tion to the court is created. See § 75-3-501. 
The fundamental responsibility is that of a 
trustee. Unlike many trustees, a personal rep-
resentative's authority is derived from appoint-
ment by the public agency known as the court. 
But, the Code also makes it clear that the per-
sonal representative, in spite of the source of 
his authority, is to proceed with the adminis-
tration, settlement and distribution of the es-
tate by use of statutory powers and in accor-
dance with statutory directions. See §§ 75-3-
106 and 75-3-704. Subsection (2) is particularly 
important, for it ties the question of personal 
liability for administrative or distributive acts 
to the question of whether the act was "autho-
rized at the time." Thus, a personal representa-
tive may rely upon and be protected by a will 
which has been probated without adjudication 
or an order appointing him to administer 
which is issued in no-notice proceedings even 
though proceedings occurring later may 
change the assumption as to whether the dece-
dent died testate or intestate. See § 75-3-302 
concerning the status of a will probated with-
out notice and § 75-3-102 concerning the inef-
fectiveness of an unprobated will. However, it 
does not follow from the fact that the personal 
representative distributed under authority 
that the distributees may not be liable to re-
store the property or values received if the as-
sumption concerning testacy is later changed. 
See §§ 75-3-909 and 75-3-1004. Thus, a distri-
bution may be "authorized at the time" within 
the meaning of this section, but be "improper" 
under the latter section. 
Subsection (3) is designed to reduce or elimi-
nate differences in the amenability to suit of 
personal representatives appointed under this 
Code and under traditional assumptions. Also, 
the subsection states that so far as the law of 
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possessed by the personal representative. 
Thus, if the power is unexercised prior to its 
termination, its lapse clears the title of devi-
sees and heirs. Purchasers from devisees or 
heirs who are "distributees" may be protected 
also by § 75-3-910. The power over title of an 
absolute owner is conceived to embrace all pos-
sible transactions which might result in a con-
veyance or encumbrance of assets, or in a 
change of rights of possession. The relationship 
of the personal representative to the estate is 
that of a trustee. Hence, personal creditors or 
successors of a personal representative cannot 
75-3-711. Improper exercise 
ciary duty. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-711, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 4. 
Editorial Board Comment. — An inter-
ested person has two principal remedies to 
forestall a personal representative from com-
mitting a breach of fiduciary duty. (1) Under 
§ 75-3-607 he may apply to the court for an 
order restraining the personal representative 
from performing any specified act or from exer-
cising any power in the course of administra-
tion. (2) Under S 75-3-611 he may petition the 
court for an order removing the personal repre-
sentative. 
Evidence of a proceeding, or order, restrain-
ing a personal representative from selling, 
leasing, encumbering or otherwise affecting ti-
Am. Jur. 2d. — 31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors 
and Administrators § 528. 
C.J.S. — 33 C.J.S. Executors and Adminis-
trators §§ 184, 207, 210 to 213, 215, 219, 220, 
242 to 251, 272, 322. 
A.L.R. — Liability of executor or adminis-
trator for negligence or default in defending 
action against estate, 14 A.L.R.3d 1036. 
Agent or attorney, liability of executor or ad-
ministrator, or his bond, for loss caused to es-
tate by act or default of his, 28 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
avail themselves of his title to any greater ex-
tent than is true generally of creditors and suc-
cessors of trustees. Interested persons who are 
apprehensive of possible misuse of power by a 
personal representative may secure them-
selves by use of the devices implicit in the sev-
eral sections of Parts 1 and 3 of this chapter. 
See especially S§ 75-3-501, 75-3-605. 75-3-607 
and 75-3-611. 
Compiler's Notes. — The corresponding 
section in the official text of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code is numbered § 3-711. 
of power — Breach of fidu-
tle to real property subject to administration, if 
properly recorded under the laws of this state, 
would be effective to prevent a purchaser from 
acquiring a marketable title under the usual 
rules relating to recordation of real property 
titles. 
In addition. SS 75-1-302 and 75-3-105 autho-
rize joinder of third persons who may be in-
volved in contemplated transactions with a 
personal representative in proceedings to re-
strain a personal representative under 
S 75-3-607. 
Compiler's Notes. — The corresponding 
section in the official text of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code is numbered § 3-712. 
Liability of executor, administrator, trustee, 
or his counsel for interest, penalty, or extra 
taxes assessed against estate because of tax 
law violations, 47 A.L.R.3d 507. 
Overpaying or unnecessarily paying tax, lia-
bility of executor or administrator to estate be-
cause of, 55 A.L.R.3d 785. 
Garnishment against executor or adminis-
trator by creditor of estate, 60 A.L.R.3d 1301. 
Key Numbers. — Executors and Adminis-
trators «=» 91, 103, 104, 116 to 120. 
If the exercise of power concerning the estate is improper, the personal 
representative is liable to interested persons for damage or loss resulting from 
breach of his fiduciary duty to the same extent as a trustee of an express trust. 
The rights of purchasers and others dealing with a personal representative 
shall be determined as provided in Sections 75-3-712 and 75-3-713. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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75-3-907 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
75-3-907. Distribution in kind — Evidence. 
If distribution in kind is made, the personal representative shall execute an 
instrument or deed of distribution assigning, transferring, or releasing the 
assets to the distributee as evidence of the distributee's title to the property. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-907, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 4. 
Editorial Board Comment. — This and 
sections following should be read with 
§ 75-3-708 which permits the personal repre-
sentative to leave certain assets of a decedents 
estate in the possession of the person presump-
tively entitled thereto. The "release" contem-
plated by this section would be used as evi-
dence that the personal representative had de-
termined that he would not need to disturb the 
possession of an heir or devisee for purposes of 
administration. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-908, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, S 4. 
Editorial Board Comment. — The purpose 
of this section is to channel controversies 
which may arise among successors of a dece-
dent because of improper distributions through 
the personal representative who made the dis-
History: C. 1953, 75-3-909, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 4, 
Editorial Board Comment. — The term 
"improperly" as used in this section must be 
read in light of § 75-3-703 and the manifest 
purpose of this and other sections of the Code 
to shift questions concerning the propriety of 
various distributions from the fiduciary to the 
distributees in order to prevent every adminis-
tration from becoming an adjudicated matter. 
Under S 75-3-710. a personal representa-
tive's relationship to assets of the estate is de-
scribed as the "same power as an absolute 
owner would have." A personal representative 
may, however, acquire a full title to estate as-
sets, as in the case where particular items are 
conveyed to the personal representative by 
sellers, transfer agents or others. The language 
of this section is designed to cover instances 
where the instrument of distribution operates 
as a transfer, as well as those in which its oper-
ation is more like a release. 
tnbution, or a successor personal representa-
tive. Section 75-3-107 does not bar appoint-
ment proceedings initiated to secure appoint-
ment of a personal representative to correct an 
erroneous distribution made by a prior repre-
sentative. But see 5 75-3-1006. 
Thus, a distribution may be "authorized at the 
time" as contemplated by § 75-3-703, and still 
be "improper" under this section. Section 
75-3-703 is designed to permit a personal rep-
resentative to distribute without risk in some 
cases, even though there has been no adjudica-
tion. When an unadjudicated distribution has 
occurred, the rights of persons to show that the 
basis for the distribution (e.g., an informally 
probated will, or informally issued letters of 
75-3-908. Distribution — Right or title of distributee. 
Proof that a distributee has received an instrument or deed of distribution 
of assets in kind, or payment in distribution, from a personal representative, 
is conclusive evidence that the distributee has succeeded to the interest of the 
estate in the distributed assets, as against all persons interested in the estate, 
except that the personal representative may recover the assets or their value 
if the distribution was improper. 
75-3-909. Improper distribution — Liability of distributee. 
Unless the distribution or payment no longer can be questioned because of 
adjudication, estoppel, or limitation, a distributee of property improperly dis-
tributed or paid, or a claimant who was improperly paid, is liable to return the 
property improperly received and its income since distribution if he has the 
property. If he does not have the property, then he is liable to return the value 
as of the date of disposition of the property improperly received and its income 
and gain received by him. 
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
FILED DISTRiCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 2 h 1991 
%8& 
GEORGE GRANT SIMS 
I, GEORGE GRANT SIMS, a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah# 
being of- sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby make and 
publish this, my Last Will and Testament. 
ARTICLE JT 
REVOCATION £F PRIOR WILLS AND CODICILS 
I hereby revoke all other wills and codicils heretofore made 
by me. 
ARTICLE II 
WIFE AND BENEFICIARIES 
I am married to MARJORIE S. SIMS (hereinafter referred to as 
•my wife"). The beneficiary of my estate will be my wife (either 
outright or in trust, or both, as hereinafter set forth) or, if 
she predeceases me, the beneficiaries of my estate shall be the 
individuals named or indicated in Article V. 
ARTICLE III 
PAYMENT OF TAXES, DEBTS AND EXPENSES 
I direct that all of my due and unpaid debts, all expenses 
of my last illness, burial, and the administration of my estate, 
and all taxes due at the date of my death or as a result of my 
death, shall be paid as soon after my death as practical. 
QP\ <7 
ARTICLE .IV 
BEQUEST OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND EFFECTS 
I h e r e b y g i v e , d e v i s e and b e q u e a t h c e r t a i n i t e m s of my 
t a n g i b l e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y t o t h o s e p e r s o n s i n t h e manner s e t 
f o r t h i n a w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t or l i s t w h i c h h a s b e e n , or w h i c h 
w i l l b e , p r e p a r e d , d a t e d and s i g n e d by me and a t t a c h e d t o t h i s 
W i l l and w h i c h s t a t e m e n t or l i s t I i n t e n d t o be i n e x i s t e n c e a t 
the t i m e of my d e a t h . Sa id l i r t d e s c r i b e s t h e i t e m s d e v i s e d and 
t h e d e v i s e e s t h e r e o f . A l l of t h e r e s t and r e s i d u e of my p e r s o n a l 
e f f e c t s , i n c l u d i n g a l l h o u s e h o l d f u r n i t u r e and c o n t e n t s , j e w e l r y , 
a u t o m o b i l e s , and t h e l i k e , I l e a v e t o my w i f e i f she s u r v i v e s me. 
However , i f my w i f e p r e d e c e a s e s me, a l l of my p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y 
and e f f e c t s n o t s e t f o r t h i n t h e a t t a c h e d l i s t s h a l l become a 
p a r t o f t h e r e s i d u e of my e s t a t e a n d b e d i s p o s e d of a s 
h e r e i n a f t e r s e t f o r t h . 
ARTICLE V 
BEQUEST OF RESIDUE £F ESTATE 
I f my w i f e s u r v i v e s me, my p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a l l 
d i v i d e t h e r e s i d u e o f my e s t a t e i n t o t w o p a r t s , h e r e i n a f t e r 
r e f e r r e d t o as Part A ( the -GEORGE GRANT SIMS ESTATE TAX BYPASS 
TRUST") and P a r t B ( t h e "MARJORIE S. SIMS MARITAL DEDUCTION 
PORTION") e a c h a s c e r t a i n e d as h e r e i n a f t e r s e t f o r t h i n A r t i c l e 
V I I I . 
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The H a r j o r i e S. S ims M a r i t a l D e d u c t i o n P o r t i o n s h a l l be 
d i s t r i b u t e d a s s o o n a f t e r my d e a t h a s p r a c t i c a l t o my w i f e 
o u t r i g h t and t r e e of t r u s t . 
The George Grant Sims E s t a t e Tax Bypass Trus t s h a l l be held 
i n Trust by t h e T r u s t e e s h e r e i n a f t e r named f o r the b e n e f i t of my 
w i f e during her l i f e t i m e . The T r u s t e e s s h a l l d i s t r i b u t e t o her 
w i t h o u t any c o n d i t i o n s r a l l o f t h e income of s a i d t r u s t . The 
T r u s t e e s s h a l l a l s o d i s t r i b u t e a s mu^h of t h e p r i n c i p a l as i s 
n e c e s s a r y f o r her proper h e a l t h , suppor t , and maintenance and t o 
ma in ta in her i n the s tandard ot l i v i n g that she enjoyed during my 
l i f e t i m e . Upon t h e d e a t h of my w i f e , t h e T r u s t e e s h a l l pay t o 
t h e f o l l o w i n g p e r s o n s , the f o l l o w i n g s p e c i f i c sums: 
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 t o DONALD E. SMITH, MD 
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 t o MARK MUIR, MD 
The T r u s t e e s h a l l then d i s t r i b u t e the r e s i d u e of t h i s Trust 
in the f o l l o w i n g manner: 
ONE-THIRD: ELNA MITCHELL 
ONE-THIRD: NEIL MITCHELL 
ONE-THIRD: LINDA WOOD 
I f any o f t h e a b o v e i n d i v i d u a l s , e x c e p t LINDA WOOD, a r e 
t h e n d e c e a s e d , h i s or h e r s h a r e s h a l l be d i s t r i b u t e d t o h i s or 
h e r i s s u e by r i g h t o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . As t o LINDA WOOD, i f s h e 
should be d e c e a s e d a t the t ime of my dea th , then her share s h a l l 
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be distributed to IAN MITCHELL and-AMY MITCHELL, in equal shares. 
If my wife predeceases me, the residue of my estate shall be 
distributed to: DONALD E. SMITH, MD. and MARK MUIR, MD., 
$10,000*00 each and to ELNA MITCHELL, NEIL MITCHELL and LINDA 
WOOD, one-third each, but if any of them, except LINDA WOOD, 
predecease me, then to his or her issue by right of 
representation* If LINDA WOOD predeceases me, then her share 




In the event my wife and I die under such circumstances that 
it cannot be determined which of us were first to die, all 
properties ot my estate shall be administered as though my wife 
were the last to die* 
ARTICLE VII 
APPOINTMENT OF FIDUCIARIES 
1. Appointment of Personal Representative. I appoint my 
wife to be Personal Representative of my Will. If my wife does 
not survive me or is otherwise unable or unwilling to serve as 
personal representative, then I appoint my nephew, NEIL MITCHELL, 
to serve as co-personal representatives of my estate. In the 
event both are unable or unwilling to serve as Personal 
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Representative of my Will, the Personal Representative shall be 
IAN MITCHELL, son of NEIL MITCHELL. 
2. Appointment of Trustees. I appoint my wife and NEIL 
MITCHELL, to be the co-trustees of the George Grant Sims Estate 
Tax Bypass Trust created under this Will. In the event either 
Trustee is unable or unwilling to serve, the other of them shall 
serve as Trustee. In the event both are unable or unwilling to 
serve, the other of them shall serve as Trustee. In the *vent 
both are unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee, the Trustee 
shall be IAN MITCHELL, son of NEIL MITCHELL. 
3. Appointment of Guardian and Conservator. In the event I 
become incompetent during my lifetime, I direct that my wife be 
appointed the guardian of my person and the conservator ot my 
estate. If she is unable or unwilling to serve, I direct that 
NEIL MITCHELL be appointed guardian and conservator or, if he is 
unable or unwilling to serve, then IAN MITCHELL, his son shall 
serve as the sole guardian and conservator. My guardian and 
conservator shall serve without bond. I direct that as long as 
there are funds available I be taken care of in my home and not 
placed in a nursing home or similar facility unless home care is 
impossible because of the nature of the care required. It is my 
desire and direction that whatever funds are necessary be spent 
for my support, care and maintenance without regard or concern 
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f o r c o n s e r v i n g a n y p o r t i o n of my e s t a t e f o r s u b s e q u e n t 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s ' t h e r e o f . 
ARTICLE V I I I 
ASCERTAINMENT OF GEORGE GRANT SIMS ESTATE TAX BYPASS TRUST 
AND MARJORIE S. SIMS MARITAL DEDUCTION PORTION. 
I f my w i f e s u r v i v e s me , P a r t A and P a r t B a s s e t f o r t h i n 
A r t i c l e V s h a l l be a s c e r t a i n e d a s f o l l o w s : 
1 . T h e r e s h a l l f i r s t be d e t e r m i n e d t h e v a l u e of toy g r o s s 
e s t a t e ( i n c l u d i n g p r o p e r t y n o t a d m i n i s t e r e d i n my e s t a t e ) f o r t h e 
p u r p o s e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s F e d e r a l E s t a t e Tax. 
2 . T h e r e s h a l l be d e d u c t e d from such v a l u e t h e amoun t , t o 
t h e e x t e n t a l l o w a b l e a s a d e d u c t i o n i n t h e c o m p u t a t i o n of t h e 
F e d e r a l E s t a t e Tax , of a l l f u n e r a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n e x p e n s e s , 
and a l l c l a i m s a g a i n s t my e s t a t e b u t t h e r e s h a l l n o t be d e d u c t e d 
any e s t a t e , i n h e r i t a n c e , t r a n s f e r , l e g a c y o r s u c c e s s i o n t a x e s , 
r e f e r r e d t o i n A r t i c l e I I I . The a m o u n t s o d e t e r m i n e d s h a l l be 
p a i d o u t p u r s u a n t t o A r t i c l e I I I a b o v e . 
3 . P a r t A s h a l l be e q u a l t o t h e amount ( c u r r e n t l y $600 ,000) 
t h a t may p a s s f r e e of Federal E s t a t e Tax by reason ot the U n i f i e d 
C r e d i t A g a i n s t Tax u n d e r S e c t i o n 2010 o f t h e I n t e r n a l Revenue 
Code of 1986 , as amended (or i t s s u c c e s s o r ) reduced by the t o t a l 
o f (1) a l l i t e m s i n c l u d a b l e i n my e s t a t e f o r f e d e r a l e s t a t e t a x 
purposes which are d i sposed of i n p r e v i o u s A r t i c l e s o t t h i s W i l l 
q&£ 
or which pass outside of this Will but only if such items do not 
qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduction or the 
federal estate tax charitable deduction, and (2) the amount of 
any administration expenses claimed as income tax rather than 
estate tax deductions* Part A shall be held, administered and 
distributed as set forth in Article V, 
For purposes o£ allocating my residuary estate between Part 
A and Part B, all property owned by me at the time of my death 
shall be valued at the same value that was used for federal 
estate tax purposes. If I should die possessed of any terminable 
or other interest which cannot quality for the "marital 
deduction" under the Federal Estate Tax law, such interest shall 
be allocated to this Part A. If there are any federal or state 
estate and inheritance taxes due and payable on my death, they 
shall be paid out of the toregoing assets allocated to Part A. 
No estate taxes shall be paid out of Part B. 
4. Part B shall consist ot the rest, residue and remainder 
of my estate not disposed of pursuant to the foregoing provisions 
of my Will. I hereby direct that whenever possible, assets that 
will qualify for the federal estate tax "marital deduction" shall 
be allocated to Part B after, however, Part A is properly funded. 
If there are assets that will not qualify for the marital 
deduction I direct that those assets be allocated, to the extent 
7 
possible without exceeding the limits set forth above, to Part A 
above. If there are assets that will cause the limitations on 
Part A to be exceeded, those assets shall be allocated to Part B 
although they will not qualify for the marital deduction* The 
decision of my Personal Representative as to the property to be 
allocated to Part A and Part B shall be final and conclusive and 
binding upon all beneficiaries. However, the property allocated 
to Part B shall have an aggregate fair market value- clearly 
representative of the appreciation or depreciation in the value 
to the date of dates of each distribution of all property then 
available for distribution. Part B shall not be diminished by 
any estate, inheritance, transfer, legacy or succession taxes or 
duties, either state or federal. If the value of my residuary 
estate is less than the amount that may be allocated to Part A 




Trustee shall have the additional powers, authorities, and 
discretions set forth in Part 4f Chapter 7, Title 75 of the 
Uniform Trustees' Powers Provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code (or its successor), which are incorporated herein by 
reference. 
e 
I , GEORGE GRANT SIMS# the T e s t a t o r , s i g n my name t o t h i s 
ins trument t h i s ljS_ day of J u l y , 1991 , and be ing f i r s t duly 
sworn, do hereby declare t o the undersigned authori ty that I sign 
i t w i l l i n g l y (or w i l l i n g l y d irec t another to s ign for me), that I 
e x e c u t e i t as my f r e e and v o l u n t a r y a c t f o r t h e p u r p o s e s 
expressed in i t , and t h a t I am e i g h t e e n (18) y e a r s of age or 
o lder , of sound mine, and under no cqfiffstpraint or un&e inf luence. 
GEORGE GRANT SIMS, Testator 
WE, the u n d e r s i g n e d , as w i t n e s s e s , s i g n our names t o 
t h i s instrument, being f i r s t duly sworn, and do hereby declare to 
the unders igned a u t h o r i t y that the T e s t a t o r s i g n s and execute 
t h i s instrument as h i s Last Will and Testament and that he s igns 
i t w i l l i n g l y and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of 
the T e s t a t o r and or each o t h e r , hereby s i g n s t h i s W i l l as w i t n e s s 
to the Testator's s ign ing , and that to the best of our knowledge 
the T e s t a t o r i s 18 y e a r s of age or o l d e r , of sound mind, and 




COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
) SS. 
STATE OF UTAH . ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o before roe by GEORGE GRANT SIMS/ 
the T e s t a t o r , o r , and s u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o b e f o r e me by 
£tL£MAJ f. QV^/eTcJfJ and MM/AsJ d. DuA/rf _ , 
w i t n e s s e s , t h i s J?&? day of J u l y , 1991. 
My Commission E x p i r e s : N0TAR1 
Residl 
itfC**-
i^gv^W 
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